235 US 610 (1915)
…a
State may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public
safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all
motor vehicles — those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers…
This is but an exercise of the Police Power uniformly recognized as
belonging to the States and essential to the preservation of the health,
safety and comfort of their citizens…
United States Supreme Court
HENDRICK v. STATE OF MARYLAND(1915)
No. 77
Argued: Decided: January 05, 1915
[235 U.S. 610, 611]
Messrs. Osborne I. Yellott, Jackson H. Balston, Clement L. Bouv e, and William E. Richardson for plaintiff in error.
[235 U.S. 610, 613]
Mr. Edgar Allan Poe, Attorney General of Maryland, and Mr. Enos S. Stockbridge for defendant in error.
[235 U.S. 610, 618]
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff in error was tried before a justice of the peace,
Prince George's county, Maryland, upon a charge of violating the motor
vehicle law. A written motion to quash the warrant because of conflict
between the statute and the Constitution of the United States was
denied; he was found quilty and fined. Thereupon an appeal was taken to
the circuit court,-the highest in the state having jurisdiction,-where
the cause stood for trial de novo upon the original papers. It was there
submitted for determination by the court upon an agreed statement of
facts grievously verbose, but in substance as follows:
The cause was originally brought July 27, 1910, before a justice
of the peace for Prince George's county by the state against John T.
Hendrick for violating 133 of the motor vehicle law effective July 1,
1910. He is and then was a citizen of the United States, resident and
commorant
[235 U.S. 610, 619]
in the District of Columbia. On that day he left his office in
Washington in his own automobile and drove it into Prince George's
county, and while temporarily there was arrested on the charge of
operating it upon the highways without having procured the certificate
of registration required by 133 of the motor vehicle law. He was
brought before a justice of the peace and fined $15 after having been
found guilty of the charge set out in a warrant duly issued,-a motion to
quash having been denied. Whereupon he filed his appeal. At the time
and place aforesaid he had not procured the certificate of registration
for his automobile required by 133. Upon the foregoing the court shall
determine the questions and differences between the parties and render
judgment according as their rights in law may appear in the same manner
as if the facts aforesaid were proven upon the trial. Either party may
appeal.
The Maryland legislature, by an act effective July 1, 1910
(chap. 207, Laws 1910, p. 177), prescribed a comprehensive scheme for
licensing and regulating motor vehicles. The following summary
sufficiently indicates its provisions:
The governor shall appoint a commissioner of motor vehicles,
with power to designate assistants, who shall secure enforcement of the
statute. Before any motor vehicle is operated upon the highways the
owner shall make a statement to the commissioner and procure a
certificate of registration; thereafter it shall bear a numbered plate.
This certificate and plate shall be evidence of authority for operating
the machine during the current year ( 133). Registration fees are fixed
according to horsepower-$6 when 20 or less; $12 when from 20 to 40; and
$18 when in excess of 40 ( 136). No person shall drive a motor vehicle
upon the highway until he has obtained at a cost of $2 an operator's
license, subject to revocation for cause
[235 U.S. 610, 620]
( 137). Any owner or operator of an automobile, nonresident of
Maryland, who has complied with the laws of the state in which he
resides requiring the registration of motor vehicles, or licensing of
operators thereof, etc ., may, under specified conditions, obtain a
distinguishing tag and permission to operate such machine over the
highways for not exceeding two periods of seven consecutive days in a
calendar year without paying the ordinary fees for registration and
operator's license ( 140a); but residents of the District of Columbia
are not included amongst those to whom this privilege is granted ( 132).
Other sections relate to speed, rules of the road, accidents, signals,
penalties, arrests, trials, fines, etc. All money collected under the
provisions of the act go to the commissioner, and, except so much as is
necessary for salaries and expenses, must be paid into the state
treasury to be used in construction, maintaining, and repairing the
streets of Baltimore and roads built or aided by a county or the state
itself. Section 140a is copied in the margin.
1
[235 U.S. 610, 621]
Plaintiff in error maintains that the act is void because-it
discriminates against residents of the District of Columbia; attempts to
regulate interstate commerce; violates the rights of citizens of the
United States to pass into and through the state; exacts a tax for
revenue- not mere compensation for the use of facilities-according to
arbitrary classifications, and thereby deprives citizens of the United
States of the equal protection of the laws.
If the statute is otherwise valid, the alleged discrimination
against residents of the District of Columbia is not adequate ground for
us now to declare it altogether bad. At most they are entitled to
equality of treatment, and in the absence of some definite and
authoritative ruling by the courts of the state we will not assume that,
upon a proper showing, this will be denied, The record fails to
disclose that Hendrick had complied with the laws in force within the
District of Columbia in respect of registering motor vehicles and
licensing operators, or that he applied to the Maryland commissioner for
an identifying tag or marker,- prerequisites to a limited use of the
highways without cost by residents of other states under the plain terms
of 140a. He cannot therefore set up a claim of discrimination in this
particular. Only those whose rights are directly affected can properly
question the constitutionality of a state statute, and invoke our
jurisdiction in respect thereto. New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon,
204
U.S. 152, 161
, 51 S. L. ed. 415, 422, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188, 9 Ann. Cas. 736; Williams
v. Walsh,
222
U.S. 415, 423
, 56 S. L. ed. 253, 256, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137; Collins v. Texas,
223
U.S. 288, 295
, 296 S., 56 L. ed. 439, 443, 444 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 286; Missouri,
[235 U.S. 610, 622]
K. & T. R. Co. v. Cade,
233
U.S. 642, 648
, 58 S. L. ed. 1135, 1137, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678, and cases cited.
The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by
constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally
destructive to the ways themselves. Their success depends on good roads,
the construction and maintenance of which are exceedingly expensive;
and in recent years insistent demands have been made upon the states for
better facilities, especially by the ever-increasing number of those
who own such vehicles. As is well known, in order to meet this demand
and accommodate the growing traffic the state of Maryland has built and
is maintaining a system of improved roadways. Primarily for the
enforcement of good order and the protection of those within its own
jurisdiction the state put into effect the above described general
regulations, including requirements for registration and licenses. A
further evident purpose was to secure some compensation for the use of
facilities provided at great cost from the class for whose needs they
are essential, and whose operations over them are peculiarly injurious.
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a
state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public
safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all
motor vehicles,-those moving in interstate commerce as well as others.
And to this end it may require the registration of such vehicles and the
licensing of their drivers, charging therefor reasonable fees graduated
according to the horse-power of the engines,-a practical measure of
size, speed, and difficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the
police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and
essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of
their citizens; and it does not constitute a direct and material burden
on interstate commerce. The reasonableness of the state's action is
always subject to
[235 U.S. 610, 623]
inquiry in so far as it affects interstate commerce, and in that
regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Congress. Barbier v.
Connolly,
113
U.S. 27, 30
, 31 S., 28 L. ed. 923-925, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Smith v. Alabama,
124
U.S. 465, 480
, 31 S. L. ed. 508, 513, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564;
Lawton v. Steele,
152
U.S. 133, 136
, 38 S. L. ed. 385, 388, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; New York, N. H. & H.
R. Co. v. New York,
165
U.S. 628, 631
, 41 S. L. ed. 853, 854, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Holden v. Hardy,
169
U.S. 366, 392
, 42 S. L. ed. 780, 791, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Lake Shore & M. S. R.
Co. v. Ohio,
173
U.S. 285, 298
, 43 S. L. ed. 702, 707, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co. v. McGuire,
219
U.S. 549, 568
, 55 S. L. ed. 328, 338, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Georgia,
234
U.S. 280, 291
, 58 S. L. ed. 1312, 1317, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829.
In Smith v. Alabama,
124
U.S. 465, 480
, 31 S. L. ed. 508, 513, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564,
consideration was given to the validity of an Alabama statute forbidding
any engineer to operate a railroad train, without first undergoing an
examination touching his fitness, and obtaining a license, for which a
fee was charged. The language of the court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Matthews, in reply to the suggestion that the statute unduly burdened
interstate commerce and was therefore void, aptly declares the doctrine
which is applicable here. He said:
'But the provisions on the subject contained in the statute of
Alabama under consideration are not regulations of interstate commerce.
It is a misnomer to call them such. Considered in themselves, they are
parts of that body of the local law which, as we have already seen,
properly governs the relation between carriers of passengers and
merchandise and the public who employ them, which are not displaced
until they come in conflict with express enactments of Congress in the
exercise of its power over commerce, and which, until so displaced,
according to the evident intention of Congress, remain as the law
governing carriers in the discharge of their obligations, whether
engaged in the purely internal commerce of the state or in commerce
among the states.'
The prescribed regulations upon their face do not appear to be either unnecessary or unreasonable.
In view of the many decisions of this court there can be
[235 U.S. 610, 624]
no serious doubt that where a state at its own expense furnishes
special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, interstate
as well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefor. The amount of
the charges and the method of collection are primarily for determination
by the state itself; and so long as they are reasonable and are fixed
according to some uniform, fair, and practical standard, they constitute
no burden on interstate commerce. Parkersburg & O. River Transp.
Co. v. Parkersburg,
107
U.S. 691, 699
, 27 S. L. ed. 584, 587, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732; Huse v. Glover,
119
U.S. 543, 548
, 549 S., 30 L. ed. 487, 490, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 313; Monongahela Nav. Co.
v. United States,
148
U.S. 312, 329
, 330 S., 37 L. ed. 463, 469, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 622; Minnesota Rate Cases
(Simpson v. Shepard)
230
U.S. 352, 405
, 57 S. L. ed. 1511, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729, and
authorities cited. The action of the state must be treated as correct
unless the contrary is made to appear. In the instant case there is no
evidence concerning the value of the facilities supplied by the state,
the cost of maintaining them, or the fairness of the methods adopted for
collecting the charges imposed; and we cannot say from a mere
inspection of the statute that its provisions are arbitrary or
unreasonable.
There is no solid foundation for the claim that the statute
directly interferes with the rights of citizens of the United States to
pass through the state, and is consequently bad according to the
doctrine announced in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L. ed. 745. In
that case a direct tax was laid upon the passenger for the privilege of
leaving the state; while here the statute at most attempts to regulate
the operation of dangerous machines on the highways, and to charge for
the use of valuable facilities.
As the capacity of the machine owned by plaintiff in error does
not appear, he cannot complain of discrimination because fees are
imposed according to engine power. Distinctions amongst motor machines
and between them and other vehicles may be proper,-essential,
indeed,-and those now challenged are not obviously arbitrary or
oppressive. The statute is not a mere revenue measure,
[235 U.S. 610, 625]
and a discussion of the classifications permissible under such an act would not be pertinent.
There is no error in the judgment complained of, and it is accordingly affirmed.
